Split of Territories in Concurrent Optimization by Désidéri, Jean-Antoine
Split of Territories in Concurrent Optimization
Jean-Antoine De´side´ri
To cite this version:
Jean-Antoine De´side´ri. Split of Territories in Concurrent Optimization. [Research Report]
RR-6108, INRIA. 2007, pp.34. <inria-00127194v6>
HAL Id: inria-00127194
https://hal.inria.fr/inria-00127194v6
Submitted on 2 Nov 2007
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
appor t  

de  r ech er ch e 
IS
SN
02
49
-6
39
9
IS
RN
IN
R
IA
/R
R-
-6
10
8-
-F
R+
EN
G
Thème NUM
INSTITUT NATIONAL DE RECHERCHE EN INFORMATIQUE ET EN AUTOMATIQUE
Split of Territories in Concurrent Optimization
Jean-Antoine Désidéri
N° 6108
8th October 2007
Unité de recherche INRIA Sophia Antipolis
2004, route des Lucioles, BP 93, 06902 Sophia Antipolis Cedex (France)
Téléphone : +33 4 92 38 77 77 — Télécopie : +33 4 92 38 77 65
Split of Territories in Concurrent Optimization
Jean-Antoine Désidéri∗
Thème NUM — Systèmes numériques
Projet Opale
Rapport de recherche n° 6108 — 8th October 2007 —34 pages
Abstract: We propose a methodology for the numerical treatment of a concurrent optimization problem in
which two criteria are considered, one, JA, being more critical than the second, JB. After completion of the
parametric, possibly–constrained minimization of the single, primary functional JA alone, approximations of
the functional gradient and Hessian matrix, as well as K constraint gradients, are assumed to be available or
calculated using meta-models. Then, the entire parametric space (a subset ofRn+1) is split into two supplementary
subspaces on the basis of a criterion related to the second variation. The construction is such that from the
initial convergence point of the primary–functional minimization in full dimension, infinitesimal perturbations
of the parameters lying in the second subspace, of specified dimension p ≤ n + 1 − K, potentially cause the
least degradation to the value of the primary functional. The latter subspace is elected as the support of the
parameterization strategy of the secondary functional, JB, in a concurrent optimization realized by an algorithm
simulating a Nash game between players associated with the two functionals respectively. We prove a second
result indicating that the original global optimum point of the primary problem in full dimension is Pareto-
optimal for a trivial concurrent problem. This latter result permits us to define a continuum of Nash equilibrium
points originating from the initial single-criterion optimum, in which the designer could potentially make a
rational election of operating point. Thirdly, the initial single-criterion optimum is found to be robust. A simple
minimization problem involving quadratic criteria is treated explicitly to demonstrate these properties in both
cases of a linear and a nonlinear constraint. Lastly we note that the hierarchy introduced between the criteria
applies to the split of parameters in preparation of a Nash game. The bias is therefore different in nature from
the one that a Stackelberg-type game would introduce.
Key-words: Optimum–shape design, concurrent engineering, multi-criterion optimization, split of territories,
Nash and Stackelberg game strategies, Pareto optimality
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Partage de Territoires en Optimisation Concourante
Résumé : On propose une méthodologie pour le traitement numérique d’un problème d’optimisation concou-
rante dans lequel deux critères sont à considérer, l’un, JA, étant plus critique que le second, JB. A convergence
de la minimisation paramétrique, éventuellement sous contraintes, de la seule fonctionnelle principale, JA,
des approximations du gradient et de la matrice hessienne, ainsi que des K gradients de contraintes sont par
hypothèse disponibles ou calculées en utilisant des métamodèles. Alors, on partage l’espace paramétrique entier
(un sous-ensemble de Rn+1) en deux sous-espaces supplémentaires sur la base d’un critère lié à la seconde
variation. La construction est telle qu’à partir du point initial de convergence de la minimisation de la fonc-
tionnelle principale en dimension complète, des perturbations infinitésimales des paramètres dans le second
sous-espace, dont la dimension p ≤ n + 1 − K est spécifiée, causent potentiellement la moindre dégradation de
la valeur de la fonctionnelle principale. Ce sous-espace est choisi comme support de la stratégie de paramé-
trisation de la seconde fonctionnelle, JB, dans une optimisation concourante mise en oeuvre par un algorithme
simulant un jeu de Nash entre des joueurs associés aux deux fonctionnelles respectivement. On prouve un
deuxième résultat selon lequel le point optimum original du problème principal en dimension complète est
Pareto-optimal vis-à-vis d’un problème trivial d’optimisation concourante. Ce dernier résultat nous permet
de définir un continuum de points d’équilibre de Nash ayant pour origine le point optimum initial, donnant
ainsi au concepteur la possibilité de choisir un point opérationnel. Tertio, on démontre que l’optimum initial
mono-critère est robuste. Un problème simple de minimisation de critères quadratiques est traité explicitement
pour illustrer ces propriétés dans les deux cas d’une contrainte linéaire ou non linéaire. Enfin on note que la
hiérarchie introduite entre les critères s’applique au partage des paramètres en préparation d’un jeu de Nash.
Le biais est donc par nature différent de celui qu’introduirait un jeu de type Stackelberg.
Mots-clés : Conception optimale de forme, ingénierie concourante, optimisation multi-critère, partage de
territoires, stratégies de jeux de Nash ou de Stackelberg, Pareto-optimalité
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1 Introduction, framework and general notations
When devising a numerical shape–optimization method in the context of a complex engineering situation,
the practitioner is faced to an acute difficulty related to the participation, in a realistic formulation, of several
relevant physical criteria originating from several disciplines. Perhaps the most commonly–used treatment of
multi–criterion problems is the penalization approach in which one minimizes a single functional agglomerat-
ing all the criteria weighted by penalty constants. The method is computationally economical, but evidently, the
resulting solution depends on the penalty constants whose adjustment is usually made with a fair amount of ar-
bitrariness. Alternately, at the other extreme in computational cost involved, when feasible, identifying Pareto
fronts made of non–dominated design points, has the great merit of providing the designer with a very rich
information about the system supporting the decision making. However the corresponding implementation
requires a very large number of simultaneous evaluations of several functionals.
A treatment of multi–criterion problems that eludes the question of adjusting the penalty constants, and that
is computationally more economical than identifying the Pareto equilibrium front, is to seek a pseudo–optimal
solution as the equilibrium point of a simulated dynamic game in which the set of design parameters is split into
subsets, each subset being considered as the strategy or territory of a given functional. Nash or Stackelberg
games are usually considered [1], [2]. Of course, the adopted definition of the splitting also introduces a
bias, but we momentarily put aside this question. Examples of successful concurrent optimizations realized
numerically by such dynamic games can be found for example in [3] and [4].
Another difficulty is very acute when optimum–shape design is sought w.r.t. an aerodynamic criterion as
well as other criteria also related to complex distributed systems governed by partial–differential equations,
mainly for two reasons. The first is that aerodynamics alone is costly to analyze in terms of functional
evaluation. The second is that, for aircraft design, generally only a small degradation of the aerodynamic
performance absolute optimum can be tolerated (sub–optimality) when introducing the other criteria without
compromising the whole engineering concept. Hence, we would like to introduce the concurrent process in a
scheme as harmless as possible to a primary functional of our choice.
To formulate this notion more precisely, we consider first an optimum–shape design problem in which a
primary functional is minimized: 
min
Γ
JA(Γ)
Subject to: g(Γ) = 0
(1)
We have in mind a functional related to a distributed physical system such as compressible aerodynamics
governed by the Euler or Navier–Stokes equations in a region external to the shape Γ. This functional problem
is reformulated as a parametric optimization problem by the choice of a shape parameterization (here assumed
in two dimensions for notational simplicity). For example, following [5]:

min
X,Y
JA(Γ(X,Y))
Subject to: g(X,Y) = 0
(2)
in which
X = { xk } (k = 0, 1, ..., n) (3)
is the support of a Bézier representation, and
Y = { yk } (k = 0, 1, ..., n) (4)
is the unknown design vector. In this case, the unknown shape is parameterized as follows:
x(t) = Bn(t)T X , y(t) = Bn(t)T Y (5)
in which t is the parameter (0 ≤ t ≤ 1), and Bn(t)T is an (n + 1)-dimensional row–vector
Bn(t)T =
(
B0n(t), B1n(t), ..., Bnn(t)
)
(6)
whose components are the Bernstein polynomials Bkn(t) = Ckn tk (1 − t)n−k, and Ckn = n!/[k!(n − k)!]. Many other
types of parametric representations such as B–splines or NURBS, or supported by the Hicks–Henne functions
[6] (as in [4]) can serve the same purpose of reduction to the finite dimension.
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In our algorithms, the minimization is conducted iteratively with the support vector X held fixed over
the design vector Y, as the sole unknown of the parametric optimization. This strategy has revealed to be
effective provided the support vector X is statically or dynamically adapted once or several times in the
course of the optimization; this important question is addressed elsewhere [5], [8]. At complete or nearly–
complete convergence, Y = Y∗A, we further assume that we dispose of reliable approximations of the gradient∇J∗A and the Hessian matrix H∗A, as well as the possibly multi–dimensional constraint gradient, ∇g∗. If the
numerical optimization is conducted by a gradient–based method such as the well–known BFGS algorithm
[7], such approximations are provided by the iteration itself. However more rustic, but robust methods such
as the simplex method [5] or evolutionary algorithms (e.g. genetic, as in [3], [4], or particle–swarm, as in [8],
algorithms) have merits of their own. In the latter case, we additionally assume that surrogate or meta models
can be elaborated to compute approximations of the desired quantities. This can be achieved in particular by
techniques of Design of Experiments [9] and/or by training an Artificial Neural Network [10], or simply by curve
fitting.
After completion of the above single–criterion optimization in full dimension n + 1, we would like to
conduct a concurrent optimization initiated from Y∗A and involving a secondary functional denoted JB, perhaps
originating from another physical discipline such as a structural mechanics, electro-magnetics, or other. We
decide to perform this concurrent optimization by letting
Y = Y (U,V) = Y∗A + S
(
U
V
)
, U =

u1
...
un+1−p
 , V =

vp
...
v1
 (7)
in which S is an invertible (n + 1) × (n + 1) adjustable matrix, thereafter referred to as the splitting matrix, and
by implementing a Nash game involving two players utilizing the sub-vectors U ∈ Rn+1−p and V ∈ Rp as their
strategies to minimize the primary and secondary functionals respectively. We denote by Y¯ the corresponding
Nash equilibrium point if it exists. Recall that by definition, the subvectors U¯ and V¯ associated with the vector
Y¯ = Y
(
U¯, V¯
)
are solutions, for fixed support X, to the partial problems:

min
U∈Rn+1−p
JA
[
Y
(
U, V¯
) ]
Subject to: g
[
Y
(
U, V¯
) ]
= 0
and

min
V∈Rp
JB
[
Y
(
U¯,V
) ]
Subject to: no constraints
(8)
Note that the dimension of the vector U is n + 1 − p; it should be at least equal to the number K of scalar
constraints (or dimension of the vector g). Thus, the adjustable dimension p is limited by the condition:
p ≤ n + 1 − K (9)
The limiting case corresponding to K + p = n + 1 is examined in a special section. Otherwise mentioned, it is
assumed throughout that a strict inequality holds above.
In the cited examples, [3] and [4], the splittings are partitions of the primitive variables, that is, the components
of the vector Y. In a parametric shape optimization, these primitive variables are shape–control variables, as
in the above Bézier parameterization, and are associated with the spatial locations where these controls are
made active, or preponderant. The splitting matrix S is then a permutation matrix and it reflects an actual
choice made of territories in the physical spatial domain where governing partial–differential equations, such
as the equations of gas-dynamics for aerodynamics, are solved. This choice is then made on the basis of an a
priori knowledge of the portions of the shape that are the most influential on the physical criteria, such as the
shock region of the upper surface of a wing geometry when minimizing the pressure drag in transonic flow.
In particular, physically–irrelevant choices are well–known to yield dynamic games that do not converge [3].
Thus, our objective is to gain generality in our numerical approaches by making a more abstract and systematic
definition of the territories, in particular independent of a priori knowledge, or intuition, of the geometrical
characteristics of the underlying possibly–complex physical situation.
INRIA
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In the more general splitting (7), the span of the first n + 1 − p column–vectors of the splitting matrix S
is viewed as the territory of the primary functional, and the span of the remaining p column–vectors as the
secondary functional territory. Thus, the open question is how should the splitting matrix S be defined to
realize an adequate split of territories. The point of view adopted throughout is to chose the splitting matrix
S a priori, that is, after solving the primary problem in full dimension alone, but before the actual numerical
implementation of the concurrent optimization; hence the choice is made on the sole basis of information related
to the primary minimization problem, and in such a way that infinitesimal perturbations of the parameters
lying in the secondary functional territory should potentially cause the least possible degradation to the value
of the primary functional achieved after completion of the initial single–criterion minimization phase.
To support our discussion, we consider the expansion of the primary functional about the convergence
point Y∗A in the direction of a unit vector ω ∈ Rn+1 :
JA
(
Y∗A + εω
)
= JA
(
Y∗A
)
+ ε∇J∗A . ω +
ε2
2
ω .H∗A ω +O(ε
3) (10)
Our objective is to propose a splitting associated with the rational choice of a basis of vectors {ω j } ( j = 1, ..., n+1),
in a manner such that the tail p vectors (n+2−p ≤ j ≤ n+1) are associated with variations | JA
(
Y∗A + εω
j
)
−JA
(
Y∗A
)
|,
that are, for fixed small–enough ε, as small as possible. The choice is made first in the case of an unconstrained
problem for which ∇J∗A = 0 at convergence of the initial phase of minimization of the primary functional alone,
and then extended to the more general case of a constrained problem.
It is assumed throughout that both criteria JA and JB are positive, and that:
J∗A = JA
(
Y∗A
)
> 0 , J∗B = JB
(
Y∗A
)
> 0 (11)
These assumptions are made although not always essential; however if necessary, these conditions can easily
be enforced by substituting the following criteria to the original ones:
JA = exp
[
α
(
JA − J∗A
)]
, JB = exp
[
β
(
JB − J∗B
)]
(12)
in which α and β are positive constants chosen such that
α ‖∇J∗A‖ ∼ β ‖∇J∗B‖ (13)
for a better numerical conditioning. Note that these new criteria vary in the same way as the original ones;
additionally, the exponential transform has the merit that it tends to strengthen convexity; for example, JA is
convex under weaker conditions that JA itself, since:
H ∗A = E H∗A + E2 ∇J∗A
(
∇J∗A
)T
(14)
whereH ∗A and H∗A are the Hessian matrices of JA and JA respectively, and E = α exp
[
α
(
JA − J∗A
)]
> 0.
2 Splitting strategy for unconstrained problems
The Hessian matrix is real and symmetric and as such it admits a complete set of orthogonal eigenvectors {ω j }
( j = 1, ..., n + 1). Thus:

H∗A = ΩH ΛHΩ
T
H
ΛH = Diag( h j ) (real eigenvalues of the Hessian matrix)
ΩH =

...
. . . ω j . . .
...
 (ΩH: orthogonal matrix of eigenvectors;Ω
T
HΩH = I)
(15)
Consistently with the assumption that Y∗A realizes a local or global unconstrained minimum of the functional
JA, we have:
∇J∗A = 0 (16)
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and
h j ≥ 0 (for all j) (17)
Thus, for small enough ε, omitting third–order terms, we have:
JA
(
Y∗A + εω
)
− JA
(
Y∗A
)
=
ε2
2
ω .H∗A ω + · · · ≥ 0 (18)
and the problem stated in the introduction is equivalent to minimizing the non–negative quadratic term
ω .H∗A ω. This problem has a clear solution given by the classical Rayleigh–Ritz characterization of the eigen-
values of the positive semidefinite Hessian matrix H∗A (see e.g. [11]). The territory of the secondary functional
should be taken to be the span of p eigenvectors of the Hessian matrix associated with the least eigenvalues
{ h j }.
In other words, after ordering of the eigenvectors in a such a way that the sequence of eigenvalues { h j } is
monotone non–increasing, the split indicated in (7) is optimal with:
S = ΩH (19)
3 Splitting strategy for constrained problems
We now turn our attention to constrained problems. From a computational viewpoint, we assume reliably
accurate approximations of the primary–functional gradient and Hessian, as well as constraint gradients are
available. This may require the auxiliary construction of meta-models. Then we propose to identify p linearly
independent orthogonal vectors {ω j } (n + 2− p ≤ j ≤ n + 1 lying in the hyperplane orthogonal to the gradient,(
∇J∗A
)⊥
, to define the strategy of minimization of the secondary functional.
Precisely, since Y∗A is a point of (local) minimum of the constrained functional JA, a vector λ
∗
A ∈ RK of
Lagrange multipliers exists such that:
∇J∗A + λ∗AT ∇g∗ = 0 (20)
where the superscript ∗ indicates an evaluation at Y = Y∗A. This gives explicitly:
∇J∗A +
K∑
k=1
λ∗k Lk = 0 , Lk = ∇g∗k (21)
Then, we assume that the constraint gradient vectors { Lk } (1 ≤ k ≤ K) are linearly–independent. If this is
not the case, we reduce the family to a maximal subfamily of linearly–independent vectors and redefine K
accordingly.
Then, we apply the classical Gram–Schmidt orthogonalization process to the vectors { Lk } (1 ≤ k ≤ K) to
define an orthonormal basis {ω1, ω2, ..., ωK } of the subspace generated by them, Sp ( L1, L2, ..., LK ) that is, the
subspace of dimension K tangent, at Y = Y∗A, to the constraint hyper-surfaces gk = 0 (1 ≤ k ≤ K):
Set : ω˜1 = L1 ; set : ω1 = ω˜1/‖ω˜1‖ ;
Set : ω˜2 = L2 − c21ω1 ; compute c21 so that ω˜2 ⊥ ω1 ; set : ω2 = ω˜2/‖ω˜2‖ ;
Set : ω˜3 = L3 − c31ω1 − c32 ω2 ; compute c31 and c32 so that ω˜3 ⊥ ω1 and ω2 ; set : ω3 = ω˜3/‖ω˜3‖ ;
etc.
(22)
In what follows, we identify vectors of Rn+1 with the (n + 1)× 1 column–vectors made of their components
in the canonical basis. Then, for fixed k, the matrix ωk ωkT represents the axial projection along the unit vector
ωk, and the matrix
P = I − ω1 ω1T − ω2 ω2T − · · · − ωK ωKT (23)
INRIA
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the orthogonal projection onto the subspace tangent to the constraint hyper-surfaces. Consequently, the vectors
{ωk } (1 ≤ k ≤ K) generate the null space of P, which can easily be verified:
Pω1 =
(
I − ω1 ω1T − ω2 ω2T − · · · − ωK ωKT
)
ω1
=
(
I − ω1 ω1T
)
ω1 since ω1 ⊥ ω2, ω3, . . . , ωK
= ω1 − ω1 ‖ω1‖2
= 0 since ‖ω1‖ = 1 (24)
and similarly by permutation of symbols:
Pω2 = · · · = PωK = 0 (25)
Now define the following matrix:
H′A = P H
∗
A P (26)
This matrix is real–symmetric and thus admits a complete set of orthonormal eigenvectors:
H′A = ΩΛΩ
T (27)
where the matrix Ω is orthogonal and the matrix Λ real and diagonal:
ΩTΩ = I , Λ = Diag( h′j ) (28)
The eigenvectors of the matrix H′A are the column–vectors of the matrix Ω. These include the vectors
ω1, ω2, . . . , ωK that belong to the null space of P and thus of H′A. The remaining eigenvectors, {ωk } (K + 1 ≤ k ≤
n + 1) are orthogonal to them. Thus, by virtue of (21):
∀k > K : ∇J∗A . ωk = 0 (29)
Additionally for such a k, since ωk ⊥ ω1, ω2, ..., ωK, we have trivially:
ωk = Pωk (30)
which implies that:
ωk .H∗A ω
k = ωk
T
H∗Aω
k = ωk
T
PT H∗A P︸   ︷︷   ︸
H′A
ωk = h′k (31)
and therefore:
∆JkA = JA
(
Y∗A + εω
k
)
− JA
(
Y∗A
)
= ε∇J∗A . ωk +
ε2
2
ωk .H∗Aω
k +O(ε3) =
ε2 h′k
2
+O(ε3) (32)
Hence if, in the dynamic game, the secondary functional is minimized in a subspace of Sp(ωK+1, ..., ωn+1),
the minimization results in a degradation of the primary functional that is only second–order in terms of the
distance from the original optimal point Y∗A. This splitting strategy is favored in the present approach.
Then several situations are possible. First, if the constraints are linear, the points Y∗A + εω
k (k > K) satisfy
them. Then, a necessary condition for the optimality of Y∗A is that:
∀k , h′k ≥ 0 (33)
which is equivalent to stating that the matrix H′A is positive semidefinite. More generally, whether the con-
straints are linear or not, if the matrix H′A is positive semidefinite, the a priori best definition of a p–dimensional
subspace as a strategy to minimize the secondary functional is clearly the subspace spanned by the p eigenvec-
tors associated with the smallest strictly–positive eigenvalues h′k. Again, by a priori best we mean optimal blind
choice of parameterization splitting that can be made without information about the secondary functional.
RR n° 0123456789
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Otherwise, if the constraints are nonlinear and the matrix H′A turns out to be indefinite, we propose to apply
the same strategy but after reformulating the primary problem not only by linearization of the constraints, but
also, as suggested by J.P. Zolésio, by regularization of the criterion:
min
Y
JA(Y) +
α
2
∥∥∥Y − Y∗A∥∥∥2
Subject to: Lk . (Y − Y∗A) = 0 (1 ≤ k ≤ K)
(34)
for some small but large enough positive α.
In summary, once the real–symmetric matrix H′A is constructed and diagonalized, first retain the null–space
eigenvectors {ωk } (1 ≤ k ≤ K) in the strategy of the primary functional. Arrange the remaining eigenvectors so
that αk decreases, and retain the tail p eigenvectors in the strategy of the secondary functional:
Y = Y∗A +
n+1−p∑
k=1
uk ωk +
p∑
j=1
v jωn+2− j (35)
In this way, the set of parameters associated with the two functionals are respectively:
{
JA : U = { uk } (k = 1, . . . , n + 1 − p)
JB : V = { v j } ( j = 1, . . . , p) (36)
Thus, the method of the previous section has been extended to constrained problems by replacing the
Hessian matrix H∗A by the matrix H
′
A calculated assuming constraint gradients can be computed sufficiently
accurately at completion of the primary minimization process.
4 Working out a simple case of concurrent optimization
In this section, in order to illustrate the effect of the territory–splitting strategy on the result of a concurrent
optimization, we work out explicitly a simple case of minimization of two quadratic forms of four variables,
subject to a linear constraint.
Let A ≥ 1 be a positive constant and consider the following (constrained) primary minimization problem:
A :

min
Y∈R4
JA(Y) :=
3∑
k=0
y2k
Ak
Subject to:
3∑
k=0
(
yk − Ak
)
= 0
(37)
as well as the following (unconstrained) secondary minimization problem:
B : min
Y∈R4
JB(Y) :=
3∑
k=0
y2k (38)
The parameter A may be viewed as a measure of the antagonism between the two criteria.
The solution to the primary optimization problem is straightforward. Enforcing the stationarity of the
augmented Lagrangian,
LA =
3∑
k=0
 y
2
k
Ak
+ λ
(
yk − Ak
) (39)
yields the following
y∗k = −
λ
2
Ak (40)
which, injected in the constraint equation, gives:
(1 +
λ
2
)
3∑
k=0
Ak = 0 =⇒ λ∗ = −2 (41)
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Thus, the optimal solution to the primary minimization problem is given by:

y∗k = A
k (k = 0, ..., 3)
J∗A = JA(Y
∗
A) =
3∑
k=0
Ak =
A4 − 1
A − 1
J∗B = JB(Y
∗
A) =
3∑
k=0
A2k =
A8 − 1
A2 − 1
(42)
where we have also indicated the value J∗B of the secondary criterion JB for Y = Y
∗
A.
Now, restricting ourselves to splitting strategies into two packets of two primitive variables { yk } (k = 0, ..., 3),
that is, p = 2, a total of six different combinations or games can be identified according to the variables that are
respectively allocated to the two minimization problems:
G j,k ( j < k) : A : { y j, yk } , and B : { y`, ym }(` , j, k ; m , j, k, `) (43)
Let us calculate the Nash equilibrium point corresponding to the splitting of G j,k. Clearly, at equilibrium:
y¯` = y¯m = 0 (44)
Thus, conditioned to this constraint, the primary minimization problem reduces to:

min
y j,yk

y2j
A j
+
y2k
Ak

Subject to: y j + yk =
A4 − 1
A − 1
(45)
Again, we have formally:
y¯ j = −λ2 A
j , y¯k = −λ2 A
k (46)
but, injecting this in the constraint equation, now gives:
−λ
2
(
A j + Ak
)
=
A4 − 1
A − 1 (47)
and:
y¯ j =
A j
A j + Ak
A4 − 1
A − 1 , y¯k =
Ak
A j + Ak
A4 − 1
A − 1 (48)
and correspondingly:
JG j,kA =
1
A j + Ak
(
A4 − 1
A − 1
)2
, JG j,kB =
A2 j + A2k
(A j + Ak)2
(
A4 − 1
A − 1
)2
(49)
Expressing this result in terms of relative variations, we get:
JG j,kA
J∗A
=
1
A j + Ak
A4 − 1
A − 1 ,
JG j,kB
J∗B
=
A2 j + A2k
(A j + Ak)2
A4 − 1
A − 1
A + 1
A4 + 1
(50)
The case A = 1 corresponds to the absence of antagonism between the criteria (except from the standpoint
of the constraint) and equal sensitivities of the primary criterion JA w.r.t. all four primitive variables. For this
case, all four games are equivalent and their performance is measured by the ratios:
JG j,kA
J∗A
=
JG j,kB
J∗B
= 2 (51)
This degradation in both criteria is due to the fact that two variables have been set to 0 in the unconstrained
minimization of JB. Hence for A = 1, and by extension locally also, both criteria are degraded by all these
games!
RR n° 0123456789
10 Jean-Antoine Désidéri
Inversely, consider now the case of a large A. Recall that j < k and observe that:
JG j,kA
J∗A
∼ A3−k , J
G j,k
B
J∗B
∼ 1 (A 1) (52)
For the games G0,3, G1,3 and G2,3 (k = 3), the relative increase in criterion JA is measured by the ratio
JG j,3A
J∗A
=
1 + A + A2 + A3
A j + A3
= 1 +
1 + A + A2 − A j
A3 + A j
( j = 0, 1, 2) (53)
which is greater than 1 for all A but tends to 1 as A → ∞, and is thus bounded (as A varies). For the games
G0,2 and G1,2 (k = 2), the relative increase exhibits a presumably–acceptable asymptotic linear growth with A.
Finally, for the game G0,1 (k = 1), the relative increase is asymptotically quadratic. These trends are depicted
on F. 1 (top).
Now, concerning JB, observe that it is proportional to the following monotone–increasing function of the
variable η = Ak− j:
1 + η2
(1 + η)2
(54)
Thus, w.r.t. JB, the performance of the games G0,1, G1,2 and G2,3 (k − j = 1) is the same and optimal (least value
of η); the games G0,2 and G1,3 (k − j = 2) are equivalent and second–best, and the game G0,3 corresponds to the
least effective strategy. The corresponding trends are depicted on F. 1 (bottom).
Hence, the best strategy w.r.t. both criteria is the game G2,3. But
JG2,3B
J∗B
> 1 , ∀A (55)
and all the games considered so far fail to reduce the secondary criterion.
Thus, we conclude to the failure of all the games based on splitting strategies of the primitive variables
{ yk } into two packets of two. All operational points perform more poorly w.r.t. both criteria than the absolute
optimum of the primary optimization problem. For one game, G0,1, particularly inappropriate, the equilibrium
point corresponds to an important relative increase in the primary criterion that grows quadratically with
the antagonism parameter A. Even more deceivingly, none of the games succeeds to reduce the secondary
criterion. These dramatic conclusions should however be tampered by the observation that, with such a small
number of variables, too little latitude is given to improve the performance of the initial point.
Then we develop the proposed optimal split. We calculate the gradient ∇JA, the Hessian H∗A, the constraint
gradient ∇g and the unit vector ω1:
∇JA =

2y0
1
2y1
A
2y2
A2
2y3
A3

, H∗A =

2
2
A
2
A2
2
A3

, ∇g =

1
1
1
1

, ω1 =

1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2

(56)
Consequently, the symmetric matrix H′A is easily calculated:
H′A =
(
I − ω1 ω1T
)
H∗A
(
I − ω1 ω1T
)
=
1
8A3

9A3 + A2 + A + 1 . . .
−3A3 − 3A2 + A + 1 A3 + 9A2 + A + 1 . .
−3A3 + A2 − 3A + 1 A3 − 3A2 − 3A + 1 A3 + A2 + 9A + 1 .
−3A3 + A2 + A − 3 A3 − 3A2 + A − 3 A3 + A2 − 3A − 3 A3 + A2 + A + 9
 (57)
where dots stand for omitted entries known by symmetry. Note that the row sums (or column sums) of this
matrix are all equal to 0 since the vector ω1 belongs to (and generates) the kernel. Also note that since the
matrix H∗A is positive definite, the matrix H
′
A is positive semidefinite, as it must be when the constraint is linear.
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The matrix H′A is then diagonalized:
H′A = ΩΛΩ
T , Ω = {ω j,k } , Λ = Diag( h′j ) (h′1 = 0 ; h′2 ≥ h′3 ≥ h′4 > 0) (58)
in which the eigenvectors, or column–vectors of matrix Ω, have been arranged by placing ω1 first, and the
remaining three in decreasing order of the associated eigenvalue h′j. Thus, in particular, the first column–vector
is the vector ω1:
ω1,1 = ω2,1 = ω3,1 = ω4,1 =
1
2 (59)
Consistently with the notation introduced previously, for a “2+2 split of territory”, we define two unknown
vectors of dimension 2:
U =
(
u1
u2
)
, V =
(
v2
v1
)
(60)
and parameterize the unknown vector Y according to (7):

y0 = 1 + ω1,1 u1 + ω1,2 u2 + ω1,3 v2 + ω1,4 v1
y1 = A + ω2,1 u1 + ω2,2 u2 + ω2,3 v2 + ω2,4 v1
y2 = A2 + ω3,1 u1 + ω3,2 u2 + ω3,3 v2 + ω3,4 v1
y3 = A3 + ω4,1 u1 + ω4,2 u2 + ω4,3 v2 + ω4,4 v1
(61)
In this perturbation formulation, the equality constraint imposed on the minimization of JA is expressed by the
following homogeneous condition:
S1 u1 + S2 u2 + S3 v2 + S4 v1 = 0 (62)
in which:
S j =
4∑
i=1
ωi, j (63)
But since ωi,1 = 12 (for all i),
S1 = 2 (64)
whereas, for j > 1:
S j = 2ω1 . ω j = 0 (65)
by orthogonality of the eigenvectors. Hence:
u1 = 0 (66)
and (61) is simplified as follows:

y0 = 1 + ω1,2 u2 + ω1,3 v2 + ω1,4 v1 = 1 + y′0
y1 = A + ω2,2 u2 + ω2,3 v2 + ω2,4 v1 = A + y′1
y2 = A2 + ω3,2 u2 + ω3,3 v2 + ω3,4 v1 = A2 + y′2
y3 = A3 + ω4,2 u2 + ω4,3 v2 + ω4,4 v1 = A3 + y′3
(67)
Then, we obtain a linear equation for u2 by expressing that the criterion JA should be stationary w.r.t. u2 for
fixed v1, v2:
∂JA
∂u2
=
3∑
k=0
2yk
Ak
∂yk
∂u2
= 2
3∑
k=0
yk
Ak
ωk+1,2 = 0 (68)
Now, since
yk = Ak + ωk+1,2 u2 + ωk+1,3 v2 + ωk+1,4 v1 (69)
we get:
c u2 + d = 0 (70)
where:
c =
3∑
k=0
ω2k+1,2
Ak
(71)
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and
d =
3∑
k=0
ωk+1,2
Ak
(
Ak + ωk+1,3 v2 + ωk+1,4 v1
)
= S2 + σ2,3 v2 + σ2,4 v1 (72)
where S2 = 0, and:
σi, j =
3∑
k=0
ωk+1,i ωk+1, j
Ak
(73)
This gives:
u2 = −dc = −
σ2,3 v2 + σ2,4 v1
σ2,2
(74)
Finally we calculate v1 and v2 by expressing the stationarity of the second criterion, JB, for fixed u1 = 0, and
u2. Since
JB =
3∑
k=0
 Ak +
3∑
j=0
ωk+1, j+1 y′j

2
(75)
the condition is:
∂JB
∂y′
`
= 2
3∑
k=0
Ak +
3∑
j=0
ωk+1, j+1 y′j
 ωk+1,`+1 = 0 (` = 2, 3) (76)
Hence, the linear equation for ` = 3 is:
α v1 + β v2 + γ = 0 (77)
where:
α =
3∑
k=0
ω2k+1,4 = 1 (78)
by normalization of the eigenvector,
β =
3∑
k=0
ωk+1,3 ωk+1,4 = 0 (79)
by orthogonality of the eigenvectors, and:
γ =
3∑
k=0
Ak +
1∑
j=0
ωk+1, j+1y′j
 ωk+1,4 =
3∑
k=0
Ak ωk+1,4 (80)
where the orthogonality of the eigenvectors has again been used. By proceeding in the same way for the second
equation (` = 2), we get: 
v1 = −
3∑
k=0
Ak ωk+1,4
v2 = −
3∑
k=0
Ak ωk+1,3
(81)
and again: 
u1 = 0
u2 = −
σ2,3 v2 + σ2,4 v1
σ2,2
(82)
where:
σi, j =
3∑
k=0
ωk+1,i ωk+1, j
Ak
(83)
From this quasi–explicit solution, two observations can readily be made.
First, the optimal solution is such that u1 = 0, that is, the component of the state vector along the constraint
gradient is preserved.
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Second, in the case of a vanishing antagonism, A = 1:
v1 = −S4 = v2 = −S3 = 0 (84)
and hence also:
u1 = u2 = 0 (85)
that is:
Y¯ = Y∗A (86)
Thus, contrasting with the situation of the previous splittings, here, the optimal solution of the primary
minimization problem is preserved when the criteria are equal, and this constitutes a definite advantage of this
new formulation. This property holds in a more general context for which it is established separately in the
next section.
For values of the parameter A greater than 1, we have calculated numerically the matrices H′A,Ω andΛ, the
above solution U, V, and its performance in terms of the ratios JA/J∗A and JB/J
∗
B. These new results have also
been collected on F. 1, on top for JA, and on the bottom for JB.
We observe that, contrasting with the previous strategies based on splits of the primitive variables (G j,k),
the strategy based on the split of the eigenvectors does succeed to diminish the secondary criterion JB, despite
the reduced number of parameters permitting to organize the concurrent game. This is realized, of course at
the expense of some increase of the primary criterion JA, whose growth with the antagonism parameter seems
to be asymptotically linear.
Additionally, the figure provides evidence that for the proposed strategy based on the eigensplit, and for
this strategy only, the derivatives of both criteria JA at the equilibrium point w.r.t. the parameter A are equal to
zero at A = 1 (case of vanishing antagonism). To explain this, let
A = 1 + ε (87)
Suppose ε sufficiently small and let Y¯ε be an equilibrium point in the neighborhood of the optimum. Since
u1 = 0, the perturbation in design vector, Y¯ε − Y∗A is orthogonal to ω1 which is the unit vector along ∇g, which
is itself proportional to ∇J∗A at the point Y = Y∗A of optimality of the constrained primary criterion JA. Hence,
JA(Y¯ε)− J∗A = O(ε2), which explains the result for JA. Besides, since JB and JA functionally identify at A = 1, their
gradients also do, and the result is also true for JB. This demonstrates the robustness of the equilibrium point
w.r.t. the parameter A at the initial equilibrium point. This behavior is due to a general result established in
the next section.
Besides, we have examined how does this Nash–equilibrium point compare in the reduction of the secondary
criterion JB with the absolute minimum of this criterion attainable under the constraint of equal value of the
primary criterion JA, that is, at the corresponding point on the Pareto–equilibrium front defined by:
min
Y∈Rn+1
JB(Y)
Subject to: g = 0 , JA = J¯A
(88)
To solve this problem we introduce the augmented Lagrangian
L(Y, λ, µ) = JB + λ g + µ (JA − J¯A) (89)
Expressing the stationarity of L(Y, λ, µ) w.r.t. its three arguments yields the following representation of the
state vector that realizes the Pareto–optimal point:
yk = −
λ
2
1 +
µ
Ak
(90)
Injecting this result into the constraint equation gives:
λ
2
= −
A4 − 1
A − 1∑3
k=0
1
1 +
µ
Ak
(91)
RR n° 0123456789
14 Jean-Antoine Désidéri
so that:
yk =
1
1 +
µ
Ak∑3
j=0
1
1 +
µ
A j
A4 − 1
A − 1 (92)
Lastly, the above expression is injected into the additional constraint
JA =
3∑
k=0
y2k
Ak
= J¯A (93)
where J¯A is specified. This permits us to solve for the unknown Lagrange multiplier µ and identify the Pareto–
optimal point. This results in a polynomial equation that has been solved numerically by an ad hoc Newton’s
method. The corresponding value of the secondary criterion JB is indicated on F. 1 (bottom) for a range of
values of the antagonism parameter A. From the figure it appears that if the performance of the Pareto–optimal
point is slightly superior, the curves drawn by the Nash–equilibrium point and the Pareto–optimal point as A
varies are close to each other and follow similar trends.
Lastly, unsymmetrical splits of variables have also been analyzed; see Appendix A for 3+1 splittings, and
Appendix B for 1+3 splittings. In all cases, qualitatively very similar results have been obtained.
5 Continuum of Nash equilibrium points
In this section, we generalize a number of results observed in the particular case of the four-dimensional
problem of the previous section, to a more general setting.
We first consider the particular situation of identical criteria (JB = JA = J) for which the only difference
between the primary and the secondary problems lies in the application of K scalar equality constraints,
g = 0 (94)
in the primary problem only. Again, we propose the split of territories according to the vectors U and V of (7)
with S = Ω as in (35):
Y = Y∗A +Ω
(
U
0
)
+Ω
(
0
V
)
(95)
in which “0” stands for a column–vector of zeroes of adequate dimension.
By assumption, Y∗A is one, or the unique optimal solution to the full–dimension primary optimization
problem, and thus solves the equations:
∂
∂Y
(
J + λT g
)
= 0 , g = 0 (96)
for some λ ∈ RK, say λ∗A. Here, ∂∂Y
(
J + λT g
)
is understood as a row vector of dimension 1 × (n + 1), transpose
of the gradient.
In the concurrent game, considering the form given to the split of parameters, the primary optimization
problem of reduced dimension is:
A :

min
U∈Rn+1−p
J(Y)
Subject to: g = 0
(97)
whereas the secondary problem is the following unconstrained minimization on V:
B : min
V∈Rp
J(Y) (98)
Thus, assuming now that a strict inequality holds in (9), the equations defining the Nash equilibrium are:(
∂
∂U
)
V
(
J + µT g
)
= 0 for some µ ∈ RK , g = 0 (99)
(
∂
∂V
)
U
J = 0 (100)
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where the subscript U or V over a closing parenthesis indicates the variable held fixed in the partial differenti-
ation. Thus,
(
∂
∂U
)
V
(
J + µT g
)
and
(
∂
∂V
)
U
are row vectors of dimension 1 × (n + 1 − p) and 1 × p respectively.
In this setting, does the optimum solution Y∗A, equivalently defined by U
∗ = V∗ = 0, correspond to an
equilibrium point for the game? In other words: is the solution Y∗A (associated with λ
∗
A) of (96) also a solution
of (99)–(100)?
First, observe that variations in V alone about the optimal point U = U∗ = 0 and V = V∗ = 0, cause variations
in Y in the span of the tail p eigenvectors. But these, by construction, are orthogonal to the span of the K constraint
gradients which contains the gradient of the criterion at Y = Y∗A, ∇J∗ = ∇J∗A. Therefore:(
∂J
∂V
)
U
δV = 0 , ∀δV ∈ Rp (101)
at U = U∗ = 0 and V = V∗ = 0, which proves that (100) holds.
Second, by virtue of (96):(
∂
∂U
)
V
J =
∂J
∂Y
(
∂Y
∂U
)
V
= −λ∗AT
∂g
∂Y
(
∂Y
∂U
)
V
= −λ∗AT
(
∂g
∂U
)
V
= −
(
∂
∂U
)
V
(
λ∗A
T g
)
(102)
where the Jacobian matrix
(
∂Y
∂U
)
V
is (n + 1) × (n + 1 − p). Thus (99) is also satisfied with Y = Y∗A and µ = λ∗A.
Hence, the optimum solution Y∗A (associated with λ
∗
A) also satisfies the equilibrium equations, and we conclude
to the existence of a Nash–equilibrium point:
Y¯ = Y∗A (103)
Remark 1
In his doctoral thesis, Wang [3] has implemented certain virtual games in aerodynamics in the context of
parallel computing where a split of geometrical variables is introduced naturally, although all the variables
cooperate to minimize the same criterion. He considered in particular the optimization of an aircraft high–lift
devices in shape and position concurrently to maximize lift. Thus, practical situations in which JB = JA do
exist. However, we consider this situation here as a theoretical step to initiate a continuum of Nash equilibrium
points.
Although quite simple, the above result is not trivial, since, for example, games based on the split of the
primitive variables usually do not satisfy this consistency property, as illustrated by the particular example of
the previous section.
We now examine certain algorithmic questions. In a concurrent optimization formulated as several mini-
mization subproblems, each one of which being subject to its own subset of constraints, and iterated on using
only a subset of variables, it would be ideal to operate in a working space accounting for the whole set of
constraints, and to let the concurrent optimization be organized in a dynamic game solely in terms of the
criteria being minimized. However, this is not realistic, because the constraints as well as the criteria often
arise, in practical problems, from different physics usually governed by independent PDE’s possibly defined
over three–dimensional domains and thus costly to evaluate. However, a practical formulation could be to
replace in the treatment of one particular subproblem, all the functionals and constraints related to the other
subproblems, by adequate approximate meta-models.
Although retaining the above possibility of using meta-models, note that (103) offers an alternative possibil-
ity since it indicates that it is not strictly necessary to apply the constraint related to the primary problem to the
secondary problem. Indeed, by this result, we anticipate a continuity of behavior for standard cases in which
JB , JA, that is: if the antagonism between the criteria is small or introduced smoothly, then games based on
such compatible splits are expected to define equilibrium points that deviate from the originally–optimal point
by small perturbations only, and this, even if the constraint g = 0 is not explicitly enforced in the formulation of
the secondary problem. In particular, for strongly–antagonistic criteria, we propose to organize the concurrent
optimization by considering simultaneously the following two problems:
{
min JA
Subject to: g = 0
and

min JAB :=
JA
J∗A
+ ε
(
θ
JB
J∗B
− JA
J∗A
)
Subject to: no constraints
(104)
where we now assume that both criteria are positive and that:
J∗A = JA
(
Y∗A
)
> 0 , J∗B = JB
(
Y∗A
)
> 0 (105)
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Here, ε is a small parameter permitting, as it is increased progressively, to let the formulation smoothly
evolve from a trivial concurrent problem in which the two criteria are equivalent (ε = 0), to the original setting
(ε = 1), and we expect to be able to follow the Nash equilibrium point from the initial optimal point Y∗A on by
continuity.
The parameter θ is strictly positive. If not set equal to 1, it is meant to introduce under-relaxation if θ < 1,
or over-relaxation if θ > 1 in the iterative realization of the Nash equilibrium. This algorithmic aspect is
not treated in this report. It can easily be shown that the Nash equilibrium point depends only upon the
self-similarity parameter:
ε1 =
εθ
1 + ε(θ − 1) (106)
Technically, one would consider a positive sequence { εn }, with ε0 = 0, and devise an iteration in which
the Nash equilibrium point associated with the above concurrent formulation, say Y¯εn , would be determined
successively for ε = εn (n = 0, 1, 2, ...). Letting Y¯0 = Y∗A (which is an equilibrium point for ε = ε0 = 0 by virtue of
(103), at step n, the new equilibrium point Y¯n+1 would be found by the simulation of a dynamic game initiated
from Y = Y¯εn . In this way, one would expect to get discrete values Y¯εn of a parameterized path Y¯ε to which one
could associate the functions
jA(ε) := JA
(
Y¯ε
)
, jAB(ε) := JAB
(
Y¯ε
)
(107)
expected to be respectively monotone increasing and monotone decreasing functions of ε, according to trends
similar to those in F. 1, or F. 2, or F. 3. From these functions, the designer could decide which value of ε
is adequate, that is, which trade–off between the concurrent criteria is acceptable.
Remark 2
If the calculation of the criterion JA is computationally costly, assume we dispose of a meta-model J˜A for JA
that can be evaluated economically. Then, we would first apply the above technique to the meta-model itself,
substituting J˜A to JB, up to ε = 1. From this equilibrium point, the technique would then be applied to the
following modified formulation:
{
min JA
Subject to: g = 0
and

min JAB :=
J˜A
J∗A
+ ε
(
θ
JB
J∗B
− J˜A
J∗A
)
Subject to: no constraints
(108)
We now return to theoretical considerations making first the additional assumption of linear equality
constraints:
gk = Lk .Y − bk = Lk .
(
Y − Y∗A
)
= 0 (1 ≤ k ≤ K) (109)
where the constraint gradient vectors { Lk } (1 ≤ k ≤ K) are again assumed to be linearly–independent. If this is
not the case, we reduce the family { L1, L2, ... LK } to a maximal subfamily of linearly–independent vectors and
redefine K accordingly.
We consider again the concurrent problem defined, as ε varies by (104), and we assume that a continuum
of Nash–equilibrium points Y¯ε exists originating from Y¯0 = Y∗A at ε = 0:
Y¯ε = Y∗A +
n+1−p∑
j=1
u j(ε)ω j +
p∑
j=1
v j(ε)ωn+2− j (110)
The constraint equations thus write:
< Lk,
n+1−p∑
j=1
u j(ε)ω j +
p∑
j=1
v j(ε)ωn+2− j >= 0 (1 ≤ k ≤ K) (111)
But, by construction, the basis {ω j } (1 ≤ j ≤ n + 1) is orthogonal, and the gradient Lk belongs to the span of the
first K basis vectors (n + 1 − p ≥ K); hence, the above reduces to:
< Lk,
K∑
j=1
u j(ε)ω j >= 0 (1 ≤ k ≤ K) (112)
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which constitutes a homogeneous linear system of K equations for the K unknowns { u j(ε) } (1 ≤ j ≤ K). This
system is invertible since the constraint gradients { Lk } (1 ≤ k ≤ K) are linearly–independent. Therefore, along
the assumed–continuous path of Nash–equilibrium points, we have identically:
u1(ε) = u2(ε) = ... = uK(ε) = 0 (113)
as observed in the example of Section 4 for which a single linear constraint was imposed (K = 1). Consequently:
∇J∗A .
(
Y¯ε − Y∗A
)
= 0 (114)
and we conclude that:
j′A(0) = 0 , JA
(
Y¯ε
) − J∗A = O(ε2) (115)
Concerning the function jAB(ε), note that JAB is functionally proportional to JA at ε = 0, which implies that
∇JAB and ∇J∗A are also proportional; hence, we have also:
∇J∗AB .
(
Y¯ε − Y∗A
)
= 0 (116)
However, JAB contains a term that depends explicitly on ε; thus:
j′AB(0) = θ
JB
(
Y¯0
)
J∗B
− JA
(
Y¯0
)
J∗A
= θ − 1 ≤ 0 (117)
We now extend this result to the case of nonlinear constraints. Suppose we modify (104) by replacing the
condition g = 0 by a linear expansion of g about Y∗A as in (34). Suppose that this results in the definition of a
new continuum of Nash–equilibrium points, Y¯Lε . Then the above result applies to Y¯Lε :
JA
(
Y¯Lε
)
= J∗A +O(ε
2) (118)
Let
Y¯ε − Y¯Lε = v + w (119)
where v ∈ Sp ( L1, L2, ..., LK ) and w ∈ Sp ( L1, L2, ..., LK )⊥. Assuming local regularity and smoothness of the
hyper-surfaces gk = 0, we have:
v = O(ε) , w = O(ε2) (120)
Then:
JA
(
Y¯ε
)
= JA
(
Y¯Lε + v + w
)
= JA
(
Y¯Lε
)
+ ∇JA
(
Y¯Lε
)
. (v + w) +O(ε2)
= JA
(
Y¯Lε
)
+ ∇J∗A . (v + w) +O(ε2) provided ∇JA is smooth
= JA
(
Y¯Lε
)
+O(ε2) since ∇J∗A . v = 0 and ∇J∗A .w = O(ε2)
= J∗A +O(ε
2) (121)
We conclude that (135) still holds, and we summarize our theoretical results by the following
Theorem 1
Let n, p and K be positive integers such that:
1 ≤ p ≤ n , 0 ≤ K < n + 1 − p (122)
Let JA, JB and, if K ≥ 1, { gk } (1 ≤ k ≤ K) be K + 2 smooth real–valued functions of the vector Y ∈ Rn+1. Assume
that JA and JB are positive, and consider the following primary optimization problem,
min
Y∈Rn+1
JA(Y) (123)
that is either unconstrained (K = 0), or subject to the following K equality constraints:
g(Y) =
(
g1, g2, ..., gK
)T
= 0 (124)
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Assume that the above minimization problem admits a local or global solution at a point Y∗A ∈ Rn+1 at which
J∗A = JA
(
Y∗A
)
> 0 and J∗B = JB
(
Y∗A
)
> 0, and let H∗A denote the Hessian matrix of the criterion JA at Y = Y
∗
A.
If K = 0, let P = I and H′A = H
∗
A; otherwise, assume that the constraint gradients, { ∇g∗k } (1 ≤ k ≤ K), are
linearly independent and apply the Gram–Schmidt orthogonalization process to the constraint gradients, and
let {ωk } (1 ≤ k ≤ K) be the resulting orthonormal vectors. Let P be the matrix associated with the projection
operator onto the K–dimensional subspace tangent to the hyper–surfaces gk = 0 (1 ≤ k ≤ K) at Y = Y∗A,
P = I − ω1 ω1T − ω2 ω2T − · · · − ωK ωKT (125)
and consider the following real–symmetric matrix:
H′A = P H
∗
A P (126)
Let Ω be an orthogonal matrix whose column-vectors are normalized eigenvectors of the matrix H′A orga-
nized in such a way that the first K are precisely {ωk } (1 ≤ k ≤ K), and the subsequent n + 1 − K are arranged
by decreasing order of the eigenvalue
h′k = ω
k .H′A ω
k = ωk .H∗A ω
k (K + 1 ≤ k ≤ n + 1) (127)
Consider the splitting of parameters defined by:
Y = Y∗A +Ω
(
U
V
)
, U =

u1
...
un+1−p
 , V =

vp
...
v1
 (128)
Let ε be a small positive parameter (0 ≤ ε ≤ 1), and let Y¯ε denote the Nash equilibrium point associated with
the concurrent optimization problem:

min
U∈Rn+1−p
JA
Subject to: g = 0
and

min
V∈Rp
JAB
Subject to: no constraints
(129)
in which again the constraint g = 0 is not considered when K = 0, and
JAB :=
JA
J∗A
+ ε
(
θ
JB
J∗B
− JA
J∗A
)
(130)
where θ is a strictly-positive relaxation parameter (θ < 1: under-relaxation; θ > 1: over-relaxation).
Then:
• [Optimality of orthogonal decomposition] If the matrix H′A is positive semi-definite, which is the case in particular
if the primary problem is unconstrained (K = 0), or if it is subject to linear equality constraints, its eigenvalues
have the following structure:
h′1 = h
′
2 = ... = h
′
K = 0 h
′
K+1 ≥ h′K+2 ≥ ... ≥ h′n+1 ≥ 0 (131)
and the tail associated eigenvectors {ωk } (K + 1 ≤ k ≤ n + 1) have the following variational characterization:
ωn+1 = Argminω
∣∣∣ω .H∗A ω∣∣∣ s.t. ‖ω‖ = 1 and ω ⊥ {ω1, ω2, ..., ωK}
ωn = Argminω
∣∣∣ω .H∗A ω∣∣∣ s.t. ‖ω‖ = 1 and ω ⊥ {ω1, ω2, ..., ωK, ωn+1}
ωn−1 =
...
Argminω
∣∣∣ω .H∗A ω∣∣∣ s.t. ‖ω‖ = 1 and ω ⊥ {ω1, ω2, ..., ωK, ωn+1, ωn}
(132)
• [Preservation of optimum point as a Nash equilibrium] For ε = 0, a Nash equilibrium point exists and it is:
Y¯0 = Y∗A (133)
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• [Robustness of original design] If the Nash equilibrium point exists for ε > 0 and sufficiently small, and if it depends
smoothly on this parameter, the functions:
jA(ε) = JA
(
Y¯ε
)
, jAB(ε) = JAB
(
Y¯ε
)
(134)
are such that:
j′A(0) = 0 (135)
j′AB(0) = θ − 1 (136)
and
jA(ε) = J∗A +O(ε
2) (137)
jAB(ε) = 1 + (θ − 1) ε +O(ε2) (138)
• In case of linear equality constraints, the Nash equilibrium point satisfies identically:
uk(ε) = 0 (1 ≤ k ≤ K) (139)
Yε = Y∗A +
n+1−p∑
k=K+1
uk(ε)ωk +
p∑
j=1
v j(ε)ωn+2− j (140)
• For K = 1 and p = n, the Nash equilibrium pointYε is Pareto optimal.
Thus for under-relaxation (θ < 1), it is guaranteed that along the continuum of Nash equilibrium points,
the criterion JAB initially decreases as ε increases. However, this conclusion is not sufficient to guarantee the
same behavior for the criterion JB.
The very last conclusion of the above theorem concerning the Pareto-optimality in a special case will be
established in the next section. Prior to this, in order to illustrate the case of a nonlinear constraint, we have
calculated, in a formulation only slightly different from the above, a variant of the simple problem treated in
Section 4, obtained by modifying the constraint equation to be the following nonlinear condition:
g = 10
√
y40 y
3
1 y
2
2 y3 − r = 0 (141)
in which r is the constant
10
√
96
√
3. The 10
√
( ) is not essential: it permits, in the numerical experiment, to
manipulate a scaled g function that involves only a homogeneous (of degree 1) term and a constant.
Now the primary minimization problem in dimension 4 admits the following solution:
y∗k =
√
(4 − k) Ak−1 (0 ≤ k ≤ 3) (142)
The gradient vector, ∇JA, and the Hessian matrix, HA, admit the same formal expressions in terms of the
variables, and in particular H∗A is the same matrix. However, the constraint gradient vector ∇g is now given
by:
∇
(
y40 y
3
1 y
2
2 y3
)
= ∇ (g + r)10 = 10 (g + r)9 ∇g (143)
Thus, ∇g∗, and the corresponding vector ω1 are now given by:
10
(
g∗ + r
)9 ∇g∗ =

4/y∗0 = 2
√
A
3/y∗1 =
√
3
2/y∗2 =
√
2/A
1/y∗3 = 1/A

, ω1 =
1√
4A3 + 3A2 + 2A + 1

2A
√
A
A
√
3
√
2A
1

(144)
Consequently, the matrix H′A is now:
H′A =
2
A3 (4A3 + 3A2 + 2A + 1)2
H (145)
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where the matrixH admits the following four column–vectors:
H1 =

B32A3 + 12 A7 + 8 A5 + 4 A3
−2 √3A11/2B3 − 2
√
3A9/2B2 + 4 A9/2
√
3 + 2 A5/2
√
3
−2 √2A5B3 + 6 A6
√
2 − 2 √2A3B1 + 2 A2
√
2
−2 A9/2B3 + 6 A11/2 + 4 A7/2 − 2 A3/2B0

H2 =

.
12 A8 + A2B22 + 6 A4 + 3 A2
4
√
6A15/2 − √6A7/2B2 −
√
6A5/2B1 +
√
6A3/2
4 A7
√
3 − √3A3B2 + 2 A3
√
3 − √3AB0

(146)
H3 =

.
.
8 A7 + 6 A5 + AB12 + 2 A
4 A13/2
√
2 + 3 A9/2
√
2 −
√
2A3/2B1 −
√
2
√
AB0

H4 =

.
.
.
4 A6 + 3 A4 + 2 A2 + B02

(147)
where
B = 1 + 2 A + 3 A2 + 4 A3 (148)
and
B0 = B − 1 , B1 = B − 2 A , B2 = B − 3 A2 , B3 = B − 4 A3 (149)
and . stands for terms known by symmetry and omitted for brevity. The diagonalization of the matrix H
permits us to identify a new eigenvector matrix Ω. To maintain the continuity of the optimization variables U
and V as the antagonism parameter A varies, the sign of the eigenvectors, after normalization and appropriate
ordering, has been defined uniquely by forcing the diagonal elements of the matrixΩ to be positive.
From this point, for the 2+2 splitting, the formal solution of Section 4 is amended. In particular, since the
change of variables now reflects a different expression for y∗k and a nonzero u1,
yk = y∗k + ωk+1,1 u1 + ωk+1,2 u2 + ωk+1,3 v2 + ωk+1,4 v1 (0 ≤ k ≤ 3) (150)
The derivation of v1 and v2 is similar; we get α = 1 and β = 0, but:
γ =
3∑
k=0
y∗k +
1∑
j=0
ωk+1, j+1
ωk+1,4 =
3∑
k=0
y∗k ωk+1,4 (151)
Consequently, independently of u1 and u2:

v1 = −
3∑
k=0
y∗k ωk+1,4
v2 = −
3∑
k=0
y∗k ωk+1,3
(152)
The remaining unknowns u1 and u2 are obtained by expressing that the primary criterion JA, subject to the
constraint g = 0, is stationary w.r.t. the vector U for fixed V, that is:(
∂
∂U
)
V
(
JA + λg
)
= 0 , g = 0 (153)
By eliminating the Lagrange multiplier λ, we get the following system of two nonlinear equations for u1 and
u2: 
g = 0
h =
∂JA
∂u1
∂g
∂u2
− ∂JA
∂u2
∂g
∂u1
= 0
(154)
The Nash equilibrium point has been evaluated numerically for different values of the parameter A (1 ≥ A ≥
3). For each value, the eigenvector matrix Ω is identified by diagonalization of the matrixH and appropriate
ordering of the eigenvalues and scaling of the eigenvectors. Then { y∗k } (0 ≤ k ≤ 3), v1 and v2 are computed;
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lastly, u1 and u2 are calculated by solving the nonlinear system g = h = 0 for u1 and u2 by Newton’s method,
by which, at the n-th iteration, after solving the system:

∂g
∂u1
∂g
∂u2
∂h
∂u1
∂h
∂u2

(n) (
δu1
δu2
)
= −
(
g
h
)(n)
(155)
the unknowns u(n)1 and u
(n)
2 are incremented of δu1 and δu2. To implement the iteration, we have used the
following expressions for derivatives, for i = 1, 2:
∂g
∂ui
=
g + r
10
3∑
k=0
4 − k
yk
ωk+1,i (156)
∂2g
∂ui ∂u j
=
1
g + r
∂g
∂ui
∂g
∂u j
− g + r
10
3∑
k=0
4 − k
y2k
ωk+1,i ωk+1, j (157)
∂JA
∂ui
=
3∑
k=0
2yk
Ak
ωk+1,i (158)
∂2JA
∂ui ∂u j
=
3∑
k=0
2ωk+1,iωk+1, j
Ak
(159)
∂h
∂u1
=
∂2JA
∂u21
∂g
∂u2
+
∂JA
∂u1
∂2g
∂u2∂u1
− ∂
2JA
∂u2∂u1
∂g
∂u1
− ∂JA
∂u2
∂2g
∂u21
(160)
∂h
∂u2
=
∂2JA
∂u1∂u2
∂g
∂u2
+
∂JA
∂u1
∂2g
∂u22
− ∂
2JA
∂u22
∂g
∂u1
− ∂JA
∂u2
∂2g
∂u1∂u2
(161)
This solution has been calculated numerically for values of A varying from 1 to 3. The corresponding ratios
J¯A/J∗A and J¯B/J
∗
B are plotted on F. 4. The derivatives w.r.t. A of both criteria are again visibly equal to zero
at A = 1. On F. 5 is plotted the variation of the optimization variables u1 and u2 with the parameter A. The
variable u1 would be identically equal to zero if the constraint were linear; here it is found, as expected, equal
to zero at A = 1 with a zero derivative. Thus, these results provide some evidence to confirm in this case of
nonlinear constraint, that the initial optimum is robust. To be complete, we also provide on F. 6 the variation
of the optimization variables v1 and v2 that control the secondary criterion JB; these are also equal to zero at
A = 1 but have visibly nonzero derivatives.
6 The special case K + p = n + 1 and the connection with Pareto fronts
6.1 Generalities
When K + p = n + 1, the dimension of the vector U is just equal to the number of scalar constraints applied to
the primary problem. In this case, in the Nash game, the primary functional JA does not play any role, and
the primary subproblem only acts as an algebraic constraint of dimension K put on the secondary subproblem.
Thus, the formulation of the Nash game reduces to:

min
V
JB(Y) , Y = Y∗A + S
(
U
V
)
Subject to: g = 0
(162)
and the equations defining the Nash equilibrium point are:

(
∂
∂V
)
U
(
JB + νT g
)
= 0
g = 0
(163)
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where ν is a K–dimensional vector of Lagrange multipliers. Let Y¯ be a solution of this problem, and J¯A, J¯B the
corresponding values of the functionals, and consider the Pareto–optimal point Y¯∗ for which JA = J¯A. This
point is the solution of the problem:

min
Y∈Rn+1
JB(Y)
Subject to: g = 0 , JA(Y) ≤ J¯A
(164)
At Y = Y¯∗, the inequality constraint is saturated, and we have:

∂
∂Y
(
JB + αT g + β JA
)
= 0
g = 0 , JA(Y) = J¯A
(165)
for some Lagrange multipliers α and β (α ∈ RK, β ∈ R). Hence at this Pareto–optimal point, g = 0 and:(
∂
∂V
)
U
(
JB + νT g
)
=
∂JB
∂Y
(
∂Y
∂V
)
U
+ νT
(
∂g
∂V
)
U
= −
(
αT
∂g
∂Y
+ β
∂JA
∂Y
) (
∂Y
∂V
)
U
+ νT
(
∂g
∂V
)
U
=

(
∂g
∂V
)T
U
(ν − α) − β
(
∂JA
∂V
)T
U

T
(166)
The transposed Jacobian matrix
(
∂g
∂V
)T
U
is of dimension p×K, and the column–vector
(
∂JA
∂V
)T
U
of dimension p×1.
6.2 Sub-case K ≥ p
Given α and β, if K ≥ p and if the rank of the matrix
(
∂g
∂V
)T
U
is equal to p, it is possible to find ν so that the above
expression, in (166), is equal to zero. In such a case, the Pareto–optimal point is also a Nash equilibrium point.
6.3 Sub-case K = 1 and p = n
In this more practical special case:
U = u1 , V =

vn
...
v1
 (167)
Let ψ be a smooth real–valued function of the vector Y:
dψ =
∂ψ
∂Y
dY =
∂ψ
∂u1
du1 +
∂ψ
∂V
dV (168)
But: (
du1
dV
)
= ΩT dY (169)
LetΠ be the (n+ 1)× (n+ 1) matrix whose elements are all equal to 0 except for the first element in the first row
that is equal to 1. Then: (
du1
0
)
= Π
(
du1
dV
)
= ΠΩT dY ,
(
0
dV
)
= (I −Π)ΩT dY (170)
where the first “0” stands for a column–vector of 0. Consequently:
∂ψ
∂Y
=
[(
ψu1
)
V , 0
]
ΠΩT +
[
0,
(
ψV
)
u1
]
(I −Π)ΩT (171)
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where here “0” stands for an n–dimensional row–vector.
Now assume that a Nash equilibrium point exists satisfying (163) for some Y¯, ν. Let α = ν andψ = JB+αT g,
yielding:
vT =
∂
∂Y
(
JB + αT g
)
=
[(
ψu1
)
V , 0
]
ΠΩT =
[(
ψu1
)
V , 0
]
ΩT (172)
Let w be the projection of the column–vector v orthogonal to ω1:
w =
(
I − ω1 ω1T
)
v =
(
I − ω1 ω1T
)
Ω
( (
ψu1
)
V
0
)
=
(
0 , ω1 , . . . , ωn
) ( (ψu1)V
0
)
= 0 (173)
Hence
v = ρ1 ω1 = ρ∇J∗A (174)
for some real number ρ, and (165) is satisfied for
β = − ρ‖∇JA‖ (175)
which proves that the Nash–equilibrium point belongs to the Pareto–equilibrium front.
The result applies to the particular case of the “1+3 splitting” of Appendix B, where K = 1 and p = n = 3.
7 Successive kernels, constraints, robust design
The evaluation of the numbers α j should be used to guide the choice of the dimension p of the subspace
allocated to the secondary functional.
In the limit, in a concurrent optimization of two strongly–antagonistic functionals, variations of the param-
eters about the original optimum point Y∗A may cause excessive modifications to the original–design functional
value J∗A, to the extent of making nearly all practical games unstable. In such a difficult situation, one could, in
a first step, restrict p to 1, giving best chance of success to a subsequent first concurrent optimization. From this
iteration, one would create of new database supporting a new or updated surrogate model yielding updated
values for the gradient and Hessian. Hence, a fresh matrix HAS1 could be calculated to replace H′A, permitting
us to define a new null space, and consider again solely the smallest nonzero eigenvalue αn, and so on.
Besides, our approach opens the way to the treatment of other difficulties.
A game strategy can be used to satisfy an additional constraint that was not included in the original design
loop, by treating it as a secondary functional to be minimized in a subspace of least performance degradation.
In fact, our procedure is a form of locally–robust design approach, since we are looking for designs close to
the original one that best preserve it.
8 Conclusions
We have considered a general setting in which a constrained primary minimization problem is treated concur-
rently with an unconstrained secondary minimization problem. Several theoretical results have been established.
First, a split of territories has been proposed based on the eigensystem of a real symmetric matrix representing
the restriction of the primary–criterion Hessian matrix to the subspace tangent to the constraint hyper-surfaces.
The split is made in the perspective of identifying a Nash equilibrium point between the two minimization
problems and is optimal in the sense that it results in a least degradation of the primary functional w.r.t. the
original optimal point of the full–dimension primary problem. Second, the eigensplit has been proved to be
such that in case of identical criteria, the Nash equilibrium point is identical to the original optimal point
(Theorem 1). Thus, the formulation yields, as the difference between the criteria is introduced progressively,
a continuum of Nash equilibrium points initiated at the original optimal point. Thirdly, the original optimal
point is found to be robust, in the sense that variations in the primary functional are second–order in terms of
the deviation of the Nash–equilibrium point from the original single–criterion optimal point.
These theoretical results have been illustrated in the particular case of the minimization of quadratic forms
of four variables subject to a linear constraint. In this simple problem, all fourteen possible splittings of the
primitive variables result in a Nash equilibrium point in which both criteria are degraded. Thus all these trivial
splits of territories fail. Inversely, the eigensplitting succeeds in all cases to reduce the secondary criterion,
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at the expense of a degradation, that is an increase, of the primary criterion. Subsequently, a variant of this
problem involving a nonlinear constraint has also been treated numerically, demonstrating similar behaviors.
A practical way to implement a continuation technique to introduce smoothly the antagonism between two
general concurrent criteria has been proposed and will be tested in future work.
Lastly, the connection between the Nash equilibrium points and Pareto–optimal points has been partially
examined.
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A “3+1” splittings
In this appendix, we consider again the simple problem of Section 4 and derive the formulas corresponding to
“3+1” splittings in which three variables are assigned to the constrained minimization of the primary criterion
JA and only one to the unconstrained minimization of the secondary criterion JB.
We first examine the games in which the splitting applies to the primitive variables { yk }. Four games are of
this type:
G′j (0 ≤ j ≤ 3) : A : { yk, y`, ym } (k, `,m , j) , and B : { y j } (176)
Hence, at equilibrium:
y¯ j = 0 (177)
and for the other three variables (i , j):
y¯i = −λ2 A
i (178)
Thus, the constraint equation writes:
−λ
2
∑
ν, j
Aν =
A4 − 1
A − 1 (179)
and:
y¯i =
Ai∑
ν, j Aν
A4 − 1
A − 1 (180)
and correspondingly: 
J
G′j
A =
∑
i, j Ai(∑
ν, j Aν
)2
(
A4 − 1
A − 1
)2
=
1(∑
i, j Ai
)
(
A4 − 1
A − 1
)2
J
G′j
B =
∑
i, j A2i(∑
ν, j Aν
)2
(
A4 − 1
A − 1
)2
=
∑
i, j A2i(∑
i, j Ai
)2
(
A4 − 1
A − 1
)2 (181)
or equivalently: 
J
G′j
A
J∗A
=
1(∑
i, j Ai
)
(
A4 − 1
A − 1
)
=
1 + A + A2 + A3(∑
i, j Ai
) ≥ 1
J
G′j
B
J∗B
=
∑
i, j A2i(∑
ν, j Aν
)2
(
A4 − 1
A − 1
)2 A2 − 1
A8 − 1 =
∑
i, j A2i(∑
i, j Ai
)2 A + 1A − 1 A
4 − 1
A4 + 1
(182)
Hence, in particular for A = 1:
J
G′j
A
J∗A
=
J
G′j
B
J∗B
=
4
3
> 1 (183)
In fact, for all A ≥ 1:
∀ j , J
G′j
A
J∗A
≥ 1 , J
G′j
B
J∗B
≥ 1 (184)
as illustrated by F. 2. Hence, all four splittings result in games that fail to reduce the secondary criterion,
even at the expense of a degradation of the primary criterion. Interestingly, w.r.t. the secondary criterion the
splittings associated with G′0 and G
′
3 are equivalent.
We now examine the recommended split of territory, using the gradient vector, the Hessian matrix H∗A and
the matrix H′A of Section 4. Here, the split of parameters is:
U =

u1
u2
u3
 , V =
(
v1
)
(185)
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and it is associated with the following change of variables:

y0 = 1 + ω1,1 u1 + ω1,2 u2 + ω1,3 u3 + ω1,4 v1
y1 = A + ω2,1 u1 + ω2,2 u2 + ω2,3 u3 + ω2,4 v1
y2 = A2 + ω3,1 u1 + ω3,2 u2 + ω3,3 u3 + ω3,4 v1
y3 = A3 + ω4,1 u1 + ω4,2 u2 + ω4,3 u3 + ω4,4 v1
(186)
Then again, since S1 = 2 and S2 = S3 = S4 = 0, the application of the constraint to the primary minimization
yields:
u1 = 0 (187)
The stationarity of the criterion JA w.r.t. u2 and u3 writes:
3∑
k=0
yk
Ak
ωk+1,2 =
3∑
k=0
yk
Ak
ωk+1,3 = 0 (188)
that is, since S2 = S3 = u1 = 0: {
σ2,2 u2 + σ2,3 u3 + σ2,4 v1 = 0
σ3,2 u2 + σ3,3 u3 + σ3,4 v1 = 0
(189)
where again:
σi, j =
3∑
k=0
ωk+1,i ωk+1, j
Ak
(190)
Hence:
u2 =
σ2,3 σ3,4 − σ2,4 σ3,3
σ2,2 σ3,3 − σ22,3
v1 , u3 =
σ2,3 σ2,4 − σ3,4 σ2,2
σ2,2 σ3,3 − σ22,3
v1 (191)
Lastly, we express the stationarity of the secondary criterion JB w.r.t. the unique parameter v1. We find again:
v1 = −
3∑
k=0
Ak ωk+1,4 (192)
From this quasi–explicit solution, we observe again that for A = 1:
u1 = u2 = u3 = v1 = 0 (193)
by orthogonality of the eigenvectors, and this is equivalent to:
Y¯ = Y∗A (194)
which illustrates again Theorem 1.
The ratios J
G′j
A /J
∗
A and J
G′j
B /J
∗
B corresponding to the 3+1 splittings of the primitive variables, as well as the
ratios J¯A/J∗A and J¯B/J
∗
B corresponding to the 3+1 eigensplitting have been calculated for A varying from 1 to 3
and plotted on F. 2.
Thus, the main conclusion is that 1+3 splittings of the primitive variables fail to reduce the secondary
criterion from the initial optimal point Y∗A. In contrast, with the proposed 3+1 eigensplitting, one finds a
continuum of equilibrium points evolving from Y∗A as A increases from 1 to∞. For any value of the antagonism
parameter A > 1, the strategy succeeds to reduce the secondary criterion JB at the expense of an increase of the
primary criterion JA.
At the initial equilibrium point (A = 1), the derivatives of both criteria w.r.t. the antagonism parameter are
equal to zero.
Again, we have indicated on F. 2 (bottom) the value of the secondary criterion JB achieved by the Pareto–
optimal point corresponding to the same value of the primary criterion (JA = J¯A). The curves drawn by the
Nash–equilibrium point and the Pareto–optimal point follow similar trends and remain close to each other.
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B “1+3” splittings
In this appendix, we consider again the simple problem of Section 4 and derive the formulas corresponding to
“1+3” splittings in which only one variable is assigned to the constrained minimization of the primary criterion
JA and three to the unconstrained minimization of the secondary JB.
We first examine the games in which the splitting applies to the primitive variables { yk }. Four games are of
this type:
G′′j (0 ≤ j ≤ 3) : A : { y j } , and B : { yk, y`, ym } (k, `,m , j) (195)
Thus, at equilibrium:
y¯k = y¯` = y¯m = 0 (196)
and y j is forced by the constraint:
y¯ j =
A4 − 1
A − 1 (197)
Consequently:
J
G′′j
A =
y¯2j
A j
=
1
A j
(
A4 − 1
A − 1
)2
, J
G′′j
B = y¯
2
j =
(
A4 − 1
A − 1
)2
(198)
which is equivalent in terms of relative variations to the following:
J
G′′j
A
J∗A
=
1
A j
(
A4 − 1
A − 1
)
,
J
G′′j
B
J∗B
=
(
A4 − 1
A − 1
)2 A2 − 1
A8 − 1 =
A4 − 1
A − 1
A + 1
A4 + 1
(199)
Hence for A = 1:
J
G′′j
A
J∗A
=
J
G′′j
B
J∗B
= 4 (200)
and both ratios are greater than 1 for all A ≥ 1. Therefore, none of these four strategies succeeds. The least
degradation of the criterion JA is realized when j is maximum, that is j = 3, corresponding to the splitting of
G′′3 .
We now examine the recommended split of territory, for which we use here a more compact notation:
Y = Y∗A + u1 ω
1 + v (v ⊥ ω1) (201)
which reflects the splitting of the perturbation about Y∗A into a component along the vector ω
1, that is along the
constraint gradient, and one, v, orthogonal to it. Thus:
JB = ‖Y ‖2 =< Y∗A + u1 ω1 + v , Y∗A + u1 ω1 + v >= ‖Y∗A + v ‖2 + u21 + 2 u1 < ω1,Y∗A > (202)
since < ω1, v >= 0. Therefore the strategy of the player in control of JB is evident. For fixed u1, it minimizes
‖Y∗A + v ‖2, with v ∈ ω1
⊥. The solution is the vector opposite to the orthogonal projection of Y∗A onto ω
1⊥:
v¯ = −
(
I − ω1 ω1T
)
Y∗A (203)
Consequently:
Y¯A + v¯ = ω1 ω1
T Y∗A = (ω
1T Y∗A)ω
1 , < ω1,Y∗A >= ω
1T Y∗A (204)
and:
JB = (ω1
T Y∗A)
2 + u21 + 2 u1 (ω
1T Y∗A) = (u1 + ω
1T Y∗A)
2 (205)
Lastly, u1 is determined by the strategy of the player in charge of the minimization of the criterion JA. But again
this strategy is here forced by the constraint alone, which writes in our particular case of linear constraint:
3∑
k=0
yk = ∇g∗ .Y = 2ω1T Y = A
4 − 1
A − 1 (206)
In view of (201), this gives:
ω1
T Y∗A + u¯1 =
1
2
A4 − 1
A − 1 (207)
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and the equilibrium solution is:
Y¯ = Y∗A + v¯ + u¯1 ω
1 =
(
ω1
T Y∗A + u¯1
)
ω1 = 12
A4 − 1
A − 1 ω
1 (208)
or component-wise:
y¯k = 14
A4 − 1
A − 1 (0 ≤ k ≤ 3) (209)
Hence:
J¯A =
1
16
(
A4 − 1
A − 1
)2 3∑
k=0
1
Ak
=
1
16
(
A4 − 1
A − 1
)2 1
A4 − 1
1
A − 1
=
1
16A3
(
A4 − 1
A − 1
)3
(210)
and
J¯B = 14
(
A4 − 1
A − 1
)2
(211)
Equivalently:
J¯A
J∗A
=
1
16A3
(
A4 − 1
A − 1
)2
(212)
and:
J¯B
J∗B
= 14
(
A4 − 1
A − 1
)2 A2 − 1
A8 − 1 =
1
4
A4 − 1
A − 1
A + 1
A4 + 1
(213)
Consequently: (
J¯A
J∗A
)
A=1
= 1 ,
J¯A
J∗A
∼ A
3
16
(as A→∞) (214)
indicating a rapid (cubic) degradation of the criterion JA as A increases from 1, but also:(
J¯B
J∗B
)
A=1
= 1 , lim
A→∞
J¯B
J∗B
= 14 , ∀A ≥ 1 : 14 ≤
J¯B
J∗B
≤ 1 (215)
Therefore this strategy succeeds.
The ratios J
G′′j
A /J
∗
A and J
G′′j
B /J
∗
B corresponding to the 1+3 splittings of the primitive variables, as well as the
ratios J¯A/J∗A and J¯B/J
∗
B corresponding to the 1+3 eigensplitting have been calculated for A varying from 1 to 3
and plotted on F. 3.
Thus, the main conclusion is that 1+3 splittings of the primitive variables fail to reduce the secondary
criterion from the initial optimal point Y∗A. In contrast, with the proposed 1+3 eigensplitting, one finds a
continuum of equilibrium points evolving from Y∗A as A increases from 1 to∞. For any value of the antagonism
parameter A > 1, the strategy succeeds to reduce the secondary criterion JB at the expense of an increase of the
primary criterion JA.
At the initial equilibrium point (A = 1), the derivatives of both criteria w.r.t. the antagonism parameter are
equal to zero.
Again, we have indicated on F. 3 (bottom) the value of the secondary criterion JB achieved by the Pareto–
optimal point corresponding to the same value of the primary criterion (JA = J¯A). In this case, the curves drawn
by the Nash–equilibrium point and the Pareto–optimal point are identical by virtue of a result established in
Section 6.
INRIA
Split of Territories 29
 0
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 1  1.5  2  2.5  3
PERFORMANCE W.R.T. CRITERION J_A
G01
G02
G12
G03
G13
G23
eigensplit
 5
 4
 3
 2
 1
 0
 1  1.5  2  2.5  3
PERFORMANCE W.R.T. CRITERION J_B
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Pareto optima
Figure 1: Performance of various strategies based on 2+2 splittings in terms of the criteria JA (top) and JB
(bottom): ratios JA/J∗A (top) and JB/J
∗
B (bottom) corresponding to the equilibrium points of the games G j,k on
the primitive variables and of the strategy based on the split of eigenvectors, as the antagonism parameter A
varies.
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G’_1
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Pareto optima
Figure 2: Performance of various strategies based on 3+1 splittings in terms of the criteria JA (top) and JB
(bottom): ratios J¯A/J∗A (top) and J¯B/J
∗
B (bottom) corresponding to the equilibrium points of the games G
′
j on
the primitive variables and of the strategy based on the split of eigenvectors, as the antagonism parameter A
varies.
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Figure 3: Performance of various strategies based on 1+3 splittings in terms of the criteria JA (top) and JB
(bottom): ratios J¯A/J∗A (top) and J¯B/J
∗
B (bottom) corresponding to the equilibrium points of the games G
′′
j on
the primitive variables and of the strategy based on the split of eigenvectors, as the antagonism parameter A
varies.
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CONCURRENT OPTIMIZATION UNDER NONLINEAR CONSTRAINT
J_A / J_A*
J_B / J_B*
Figure 4: Concurrent minimization of the criteria JA and JB in the case of a nonlinear equality constraint;
variations with A of the two criteria.
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U_1 COMPONENT ALONG GRAD(G), AND U_2 ORTHOGONAL
u_1
u_2
Figure 5: Concurrent minimization of the criteria JA and JB in the case of a nonlinear equality constraint;
variation with A of the optimization variables u1, controling the perturbation along the constraint gradient,
and u2 also participating in the minimization of JA.
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Figure 6: Concurrent minimization of the criteria JA and JB in the case of a nonlinear equality constraint;
variation with A of the optimization variables v1 and v2 controling the minimization of JB.
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